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The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion:
Not Exhausted by the Supreme Court




Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "Con-
gress shall have the power ... to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries."' Under this clause in the Con-
stitution, Congress has granted inventors the exclusive right to their discover-
ies through patent law.2 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.3 had an opportunity to decide how far
these exclusive rights extend after the first sale of a patented item. Applying
the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the Court unanimously held that, under
patent law, an inventor's exclusive rights are limited after the first sale of a
patented item.4 The Court thus reaffirmed the boundaries of the doctrine of
patent exhaustion, which has been in existence for over 150 years,5 finding
no exception even for method patents. Consequently, an inventor cannot cir-
cumvent the doctrine of patent exhaustion and retain control of an invention
after the first sale by characterizing the claims as method claims.
In Quanta, the Court unanimously restricted LG Electronics' ("LGE")
attempt to control, by license, the use of the patented item down the supply
chain.6 Quanta also involved two other issues: 1) patent exhaustion in the
context of a patented item that is sold and later combined with additional
components, and 2) whether patent exhaustion is applicable to the resale of
Distinguished Teaching Professor and Associate Dean for Executive and MBA
Programs, College of Business Administration, Bowling Green State Univer-
sity; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif, Business
Editor, Law Review; M.A. and B.A. in Economics, Bowling Green State
University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. No one else may make, use, or sell the patented invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (2006).
3. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2117 (2008).
4. Id. at 2118.
5. Id. at 2113.
6. Id. at 2122. Tension exists between the doctrine of patent exhaustion and the
ability to control, by license, downstream uses of the patented item. See gener-
ally Robert W. Morris, Note, "Another Pound of Flesh": Is There a Conflict
between the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine and Licensing Agreements?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1557, 1557 (1995).
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an existing patented item "as is."7 The doctrine of patent exhaustion applies
down the supply chain, limiting the right of an initial patent holder to control
the use of a patented item, once sold, even if the patented item is embodied in
other items.8 This article examines Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electron-
ics, Inc. and its implications.
With its ruling in Quanta, the Supreme Court continued a pattern of
reversing patent-related decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.9 In the 2006 term, the Supreme Court decided three patent cases and
reversed the Federal Circuit in each.1o
In January of 2007, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,II holding that a patent licensee does not
have to breach the license agreement before challenging the validity of the
patent. A few months later, in April of 2007, the Court reversed the Federal
Circuit in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,'2 ruling that Microsoft did not
infringe AT&T's patent claims when Microsoft supplied a master software
disk from the United States that was later used to install software onto com-
puters outside the United States. Additionally, on the same day as the
Microsoft decision, the Court unanimously held in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc.13 that the Federal Circuit had improperly applied a rigid and
narrow approach to determining the requirement of non-obviousness under
the Patent Act 4 and that the courts should instead use a flexible test.
Other cases from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have fared simi-
larly. In 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the holding of the
Federal Circuit in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 15 The Court held that
the traditional four-factor test that courts in equity use to decide whether to
issue an injunction should also be used in patent cases, rather than the test the
Federal Circuit formerly adopted.16 In 2005, the Court also unanimously va-
7. Quanta, 128 S. Ct at 2120-21.
8. Id. at 2122.
9. Id.
10. See Sue Ann Mota, MedImmune, Microsoft, and KSR: The United States Su-
preme Court in 2007 Tips the Balance in Favor of Innovation in Patent Cases,
and Thrice Reverses the Federal Circuit, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89,
92 (2008).
11. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 124 (2007).
12. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1750-51 (2007).
13. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). Patentable subject matter must also be novel, 35
U.S.C. § 102 (2006), and useful, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
15. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 389-90 (2006).
16. Id. See generally Sue Ann Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional Four-
Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to Patent Cases, According to the
Supreme Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2007). Also in 2006, the Court unani-
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cated the decision of the Federal Circuit in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifes-
ciences 1, Ltd. 17 The Court held that a Patent Act exemption from
infringement protects' 8 the use of patented compounds in preclinical
studies. 19
The next section of this article briefly discusses the history of patent
exhaustion, including a non-exhaustive survey of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on the issue, as compared to recent select jurisprudence from the Fed-
eral Circuit on this issue. The article concludes with an analysis of the
implications of Quanta and recommendations for patent holders.20
II. PATENT EXHAUSTION
The owner of a patent has exclusive rights for a term of twenty years. 2'
The owner forfeits the exclusive right, or limited monopoly, and exhausts his
patent rights through the unconditional sale of an article that embodies the
patented invention.22 In other words, under the "First Sale doctrine,"23 "the
initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that
item."24
mously vacated the Federal Circuit in an antitrust tying case that started out as
a patent case. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
46 (2006). See generally Sue Ann Mota, The Untwining of Patent Law and
Antitrust: No Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases According
to the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 40 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 57 (2006).
17. Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
19. Merck, 545 U.S. at 207. See generally Sue Ann Mota, Merck v. Integra LifeS-
ciences: The Supreme Court Protects the Use of Patented Compounds in
Preclinical Studies, 29 HAMLINE L.REv. 53 (2006).
20. See generally Donald Steinberg & David Chavous, Supreme Court Review of
Patent Cases: What Will Follow eBay, Medimmune, and KSR?, 8 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 185 (2008).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l)-(2) (2006).
22. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (citing Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549-50 (1853)). Broadly defined, patent
exhaustion deprives the patent holder of the exclusive rights to a product once
the patent owner has sold an article, without restriction, that fully embodies a
patented invention. Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical Guide to Application of
(or Defense Against) Product-Based Infringement Immunities Under the Doc-
trines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied License, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
227, 229 (2004).
23. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
24. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008).
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The Supreme Court applied the patent exhaustion doctrine in the 1853
case of Bloomer v. McQuewan.25 The plaintiff in McQuewen was an as-
signee of a patent on a planing machine. The plaintiff sought to prevent the
defendants, who had purchased rights to construct and use a certain number
of these machines, from continuing to use the machines after an extension of
the patent term.2 6 The Court held that the defendants were entitled to con-
tinue to use the machines embodying the patent even after the extension.27
According to the Court, once the patent holder sells the patented machine to
a purchaser, "it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly," but instead
the patented "implement or machine becomes [the purchaser's] private, indi-
vidual property."28 Thus, once the patent owner sells the patented item is, his
rights to that item are exhausted.
In 1863, the same patented planing machines at issue in McQuewen
were once again before the Supreme Court in Bloomer v. Millinger.29 The
Court again ruled that, while patent holders have the exclusive right to make,
use, and vend their patented inventions, once patent holders sell a patented
item, "they have parted with their exclusive right... [and] parted with [their]
monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold
or so authorized to be constructed and operated."30 The effect of a sale is that
"the patented machine becomes the private individual property of the
purchaser."3 
The Supreme Court briefly acknowledged a post-sale restriction in
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.32 in 1912, but that holding was distinguished in 1913
in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell33 and finally overruled in 1917 with Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.34 In the Bauer &
Cie. case, Bauer & Cie. was the assignee of a patent on a water soluble
25. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 543.
26. Id. at 547.
27. Id. at 550-51.
28. Id. at 549-50.
29. Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863).
30. Id. at 350.
31. Id. at 351.
32. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1912). A.B. Dick sold a patented
mimeograph machine at or below cost that bore a notice that the machine could
only be used with stencil, ink, or other supplies also manufactured by the A.B.
Dick Company. A.B. Dick relied on the profits from the non-patented supplies
to generate revenue, instead of from the limited monopoly granted to the pat-
ented machine. Id. at It.
33. Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913).
34. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917).
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protein and the process of manufacturing it.35 When the patented item was
licensed to retailers, a notice on the package prohibited the retailer from sell-
ing the product for less than one dollar and asserted that doing so was patent
infringement.3638 O'Donnell, a drug-store retailer, intentionally did not
comply with the notice by buying the product and reselling it for less than a
dollar.3739 However, the Supreme Court held that O'Donnell's action did
not constitute patent infringement38 because once sold, a patented item is
beyond the limited monopoly granted by the Patent Act.39
In Motion Pictures Patents Co., the Supreme Court faced a similar situ-
ation to that in Bauer & Cie., involving restrictions imposed by license. The
Court held that patent law also did not support a license that required a movie
projector to show only films on reels containing the patent owned by the
licensor.40 According to the Court:
A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a poten-
tial power for evil over an industry which must be recognized as
an important element in the amusement life of the nation . . . is
plainly void ... [and] it would be gravely injurious to that public
interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of the law than is
the promotion of private fortunes.41
The 1940 case of Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States42 also involved
a restrictive license. Here, the United States sued under antitrust law to pre-
vent Ethyl Gasoline Corp. from granting licenses to purchasers that restricted
their resale of patented lead-treated motor oil.43 According to the Supreme
Court, "if appellant's comprehensive control of the market in the distribution
of the leadtreated gasoline ... had been acquired without aid of the patents,
but wholly by contracts with refiners and jobbers, such control would involve
a violation of the Sherman Act."44 But the Court had to decide whether the
patent allowed the control over the marketing of the motor fuel.45 The Court
held that once the motor fuel is sold, the seller "relinquishes its exclusive
35. Bauer & Cie., 224 U.S. at 8.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 509
(1917).
41. Id. at 519.
42. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1940).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 455.
45. Id. at 456.
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right to use the patented fluid,"46 and the seller may not, by virtue of a pat-
ent, use a license to restrict the use of a patented item in other devices or
processes in order to control the conduct of the licensee beyond the patent
monopoly.47
The Supreme Court once again applied the patent exhaustion doctrine in
the 1942 case of United States v. Univis Lens Co.48 Univis Lens had licensed
patented ocular lens blanks that the licensees ground into patients' vision
prescriptions.49 The license agreement set minimum prices for selling the
ground lenses.50 As indicated by the Court, the sale of the lens blank legally
transferred ownership of the blank. Univis Lens' attempt to control the pat-
ented article post-sale,5I however, was not legal.52 The Court asserted that it
had "uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with
respect to any particular article" by the reward from the article's sale, but that
"patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the
thing sold."53
More recently, the Federal Circuit has taken a different view of the doc-
trine of patent exhaustion.54 For example, in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc., the Federal Circuit found that prohibiting reuse of a one-use patented
medical device may be enforceable under patent law.5 5 More specifically,
the Court stated "if the restriction on reuse was within the scope of the patent
grant or otherwise justified, then violation of the restriction may be remedied
by action for patent infringement."56
46. Id. at 457.
47. Id. at 456.
48. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942).
49. Id. at 243-44.
50. Id. at 244.
51. Id. at 249-50.
52. Id. at 250.
53. Id. at 251. By selling an incomplete article that embodies a patented invention,
the patent holder has exhausted the right to the patent concerning that article.
Id.
54. According to one author, the patent exhaustion doctrine has experienced a re-
surgence as an affirmative defense in patent licensing and litigation. John W.
Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patent-
able Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 646
(2004).
55. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56. Id. The grant of summary judgment for Medipart, a company that serviced the
medical devices for reuse, was reversed, and the case was remanded. Id. See
generally Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent
Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157
(2007).
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In the 2006 case of Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,57 the Federal Circuit up-
held the right of a patent owner to restrict farmers from reusing its licensed,
patented Round Up Ready® soybean and cotton seed. However, according to
the Federal Circuit, Scruggs was not a patent exhaustion case because there
was not an unrestricted sale of the patented item.58 Instead, the patent owner
required that the farmers purchasing his seed not save and replant the seed.
Citing Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit restricted the patent exhaustion doc-
trine to an unrestricted first sale.59
This non-exhaustive overview of patent exhaustion jurisprudence by the
Court and the Federal Circuit, and the perceived conflict between the courts,
sets the stage for Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. in 2008.60
Il. Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics
Before discussing the Supreme Court's ruling in Quanta, a brief back-
ground of the parties and procedural history of the case is necessary. LGE, a
South Korean public corporation, acquired a patent portfolio in 1999.61 In
2000, LGE entered into a licensing agreement with Intel, which gave Intel
the right to manufacture products which would otherwise infringe on LGE's
57. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
Monsanto v. Scruggs, 127 S. Ct. 2062 (2007).
58. Id. at 1335-36.
59. Id. According to the Federal Circuit, "applying the first sale doctrine to subse-
quent generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of
the patent holder." Id. See generally Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The
Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (2007). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
had previously affirmed liability of a farmer who saved and replanted Mon-
santo's patented soybean seeds. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 545 U.S. 1139
(2005). Summary judgment against the farmer was upheld on a breach of con-
tract claim for liability. Id. at 1352. McFarling unsuccessfully argued that
Monsanto had committed patent misuse by impermissibly tying an unpatented
product, a soybean, to Monsanto's patents. Id. at 1341. See generally Marcella
Downing-Howk, Comment, The Horns of a Dilemma: The Application of the
Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion and Licensing of Patented Seed, 14 SAN JOA-
QUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 39 (2004).
60. See generally Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 763, 769-70 (2008). The Honorable Timothy B. Dyk, a judge on
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, concluded, generally, that the
Court does still matter. Id. at 763. Judge Dyk served on the Federal Circuit
panel in Scruggs.
61. LG Electronics, Inc., Company Description, http://www.hoovers.com/Ig-elec-
tronics/-ID 55961-/free-co-profile.xhtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). LGE
owns Zenith Electronics. LGE established a North American headquarters in
2004, and, after Asia, LGE generates most of its revenue in North America. Id.
2008]
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patents. Additionally, the agreement specifically disclaimed the right of any
of Intel's customers to combine products covered by the license with non-
Intel products.62 Intel sent letters to all its customers, including the defend-
ants in this suit, stating that the license did not expressly or impliedly extend
to any product the customers make by combining any Intel product with any
non-Intel product. Under its license with LGE, Intel produced microproces-
sors and chipsets, which the defendants purchased and installed into com-
puters they manufactured. LGE sued Quanta, Asustek, and other defendants
for allegedly infringing its patents by combining the Intel products with non-
Intel products.63
The defendants argued that the patent exhaustion doctrine, an implied
license, or both, protected them from infringement.64 The District Court for
the Northern District of California examined the doctrine of patent exhaus-
tion and held that LGE could not enforce its patents against the defendants,
who purchased the Intel microprocessors and chipsets and used them for their
intended and sole use under the doctrine of patent exhaustion.65 Thus, the
district court granted summary judgment for Quanta and Asustek, while de-
nying LGE's motion for summary judgment.66
In 2003, the district court reaffirmed its summary judgment and ex-
tended it to other defendants on the issue of patent exhaustion.67 The district
court cited Mallinckrodt, wherein the Federal Circuit held that the patent ex-
62. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326 CW, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25956, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002). The license agreement
itself stated that "the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or
alter the effect of patent exhaustion." Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2114 (2008).
63. LG Elecs., Inc., 2002 U.S Dist. LEXIS, at *8. LGE alleged infringement of
U.S. Patents 4,918,645, 4,939,641, 4,926,419, 5,077,733, and 5,379,379. Id. at
*7. According to Quanta, LGE contended that the patents were infringed "by
every computer in the world." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7, Quanta,
128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3187. Also
according to Quanta, LGE contended that computers containing non-Intel chips
also infringed, but these were not at issue in the litigation. Initial Brief: Appel-
lant-Petitioner at *12, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937), 2007 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1434. Other computer companies settled. Id. at *21.
64. LG Elecs., Inc., 2002 U.S Dist. LEXIS, at *8. See generally Amber L.
Hatfield, Patent Exhaustion, Implied Licenses, and Have-Made Rights: Gold
Mines or Mine Fields? 2000 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 1 (2000).
65. LG Elecs., Inc., 2002 U.S Dist. LEXIS, at *42. Consequently, the district court
found that the implied license defense was moot. Id.
66. Id.
67. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (N.D. Cal.
2003). The district court granted defendants First International Computer and
Compal Electronics Inc.'s motions for summary judgment. Id. at 918.
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haustion doctrine is only applicable when there is an unconditional sale.68
The district court held that the defendants' purchase of microprocessors from
Intel was an unconditional sale, and that Intel's notification to its customers
did not make the sale conditional.69 Despite the district court's finding, the
court granted LGE summary judgment based on the argument that patent
exhaustion was not a defense to an infringement claim concerning LGE's
process or method patents. 70
The parties were in district court again in 2004, this time disputing the
remaining method claims.7' The district court denied LGE's motion for sum-
mary judgment for infringement of method claims in three patents and
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment of non-infringe-
ment.7 2 On appeal in 2006, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that
a patent holder's rights in method claims are not exhaustible and, even if they
were, no unconditional sale triggered the doctrine of exhaustion.v3
In 2008, however, the United States Supreme Court unanimously dis-
agreed on both counts.74 In justifying its decision in Quanta, the Court re-
viewed its jurisprudence on patent exhaustion, examining Bloomer v.
McQuewan, Bloomer v. Millinger, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg., Co., and United States v. Univis Lens Co., among other cases.75
On the issue of method claims, the court concluded that method claims
- though a process rather than a tangible item - were, in fact, also covered
by the doctrine of patent exhaustion.76 Justice Thomas reasoned that
68. Id. at 916 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706-08
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
69. LG Elecs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
70. Id.
71. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., No. C 01-1375 CW, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29906, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004).
72. Id. at *33. The patents in question are 4,918,645, 5,077,733, and 5,379, 379.
73. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Intel's customers, including the defendants, were expressly prohibited from in-
fringing LGE's patent claims by combining the Intel products with non-Intel
products. Id. See generally Medhi Ansari, LG Electronics v. Bizcom Electron-
ics, Inc.: Solving the Foundry Problem in the Semiconductor Industry, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (2007); Dan Callaway, Patent Incentives in the
Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 135 (2008); John W. Osborne,
Justice Breyer's Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent Exhaustion: An
Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
245 (2008); William P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent Exhaustion
Principles in Light of the LG Electronics Cases, 47 IDEA 235 (2007).
74. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008).
75. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115-17.
76. Id. at 2117. The U.S. Supreme Court has never differentiated between method
and other patent claims and in fact has held that method patent claims could be
2008]
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"[e]liminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine," and inventors would only have to draft patent claims as
methods, rather than as apparatuses, in order to avoid the doctrine of
exhaustion.77
The Court next discussed the extent to which the product must embody
the patent in order for the doctrine of patent exhaustion to apply. Under the
relevant precedent in Univis Lens Co., the Quanta Court found that Intel's
products embodied the patents in question, and that the products "all but
completely practice the patent."78 The Court did not necessarily agree with
LGE's argument that patent exhaustion applies across patents, instead stating
the general principle that a device which practices one patent does not neces-
sarily exhaust another patent.79 Here, the first element of exhaustion was
satisfied since the Intel products partially practiced the patents and embodied
the essential features.80
In addition, the exhaustion doctrine only applies where an authorized
sale by the patent holder has occurred.81 The Court found here that "[lthe
License Agreement authorized Intel to sell products that practiced the LGE
Patents," and that "[n]o conditions limited Intel's authority to sell products
substantially embodying the patents."2 Noting that the complaint did not
include a breach of contract claim, the Court did not express an opinion on
"whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion oper-
ates to eliminate patent damages."83 Thus, in holding that LGE could no
exhausted. See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456-58
(1940). The patents at issue include number 5097409 for a multi-processing
computer system "wherein at least two CPU's, a main memory means and a
bus means are provided." U.S. Patent No. 5,097,409 (filed June 18, 1991).
The second invention was "an object to provide an improved digital computer
system," and "concerns a dynamic circular bus priority apparatus in which the
nodes connected to the bus has a present priority." U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733
(filed Sept. 11, 1989). The third invention "relates generally to an information
processing system and, in particular, to a memory control unit for coupling a
system memory to a high speed, non-interlocked system bus." U.S. Patent No.
5,379,379 (filed Sept. 6, 1990).
77. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117-18. By using entirely method claims, a "patent
drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion." Id.
78. Id. at 2120. Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that "[e]verything inven-
tive about each patent is embodied in the Intel products." Id.
79. Id. at 2121.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2122.
83. Id. LGE's other contract rights are not necessarily limited. Id. See generally
Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
[Vol. XI
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longer assert patent rights against Quanta, the Court left the door open to
contract or other claims.84
Ultimately, the Court held, "[tlhe authorized sale of an article that sub-
stantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents
the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the
article."85 Once again the Federal Circuit was reversed, and as a result, the
Supreme Court precluded LGE from asserting its patent rights against
Quanta.86
IV. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Quanta, the Supreme Court clarified that the doc-
trine of patent exhaustion does apply to method patents in addition to down-
stream products that substantially embody a patented item.87 The
"substantially embodied" requirement limits the patent holder's ability to
control the use of the patented item down the supply chain. The Court treats
all types of patent claims the same, thereby eliminating the strategy of char-
acterizing the claims in such a way as to avoid the doctrine of patent
exhaustion.
Additionally, a patent holder cannot leverage the limited monopoly
granted under patent law down the supply chain when the patented item is
substantially embedded in another product.88 Consequently, a patent holder
may not sue an authorized, legitimate, downstream user for treble damages,
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEo. MASON L. REV. 93
(2006).
84. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2122.
85. Id.
86. Id. LGE may not be able to assert its patent rights concerning the three patents
in question, but the Court left open contract rights. Id. LGE and Quanta are, at
the time of this writing, also engaged in other patent litigation. LG Elecs., Inc.
v. Quanta Computer Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2007); LG Elecs.,
Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., No. 07-CV-361-BBC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16669 (W.D. Wis. July 15, 2008). LGE has alleged that Quanta has infringed
patents numbered 7,088,655 and 6,782,488, which relate to DVD drives. LG
Elecs., 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1064; LG Elecs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16669, at
*I. LGE has sued Quanta Computer, Inc., Quanta Computer Inc., and Quanta
Storage Inc. LG Elecs., 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1063; LG Elecs., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16669, at *I. Quanta Storage, a Taiwanese firm, had its motion to
dismiss granted for lack of personal jurisdiction. LG Elecs., 520 F. Supp. 2d at
1061, 1064, 1072. The district court construed terms in the patent dispute be-
tween LGE and the remaining defendants. LG Elecs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16669, at *30-31.
87. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117, 2122.
88. Id. at 2122.
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which are available under patent law.89 However, the Court left the door
open for potential contract claims or other suits involving downstream uses.
If Congress deems that freedom of contract outweighs the policy of unen-
cumbered sale of patented items, then Congress could amend the Patent Act
to limit the doctrine of patent exhaustion.
The Supreme Court's decision in Quanta was yet another instance of the
Court reversing the Federal Circuit on a patent case. The Supreme Court
clarified a doctrine that the Court had not previously examined in over half a
century. In examining the patent exchaustion doctrine, the Court removed
any incentive for a patent holder to recharacterize an apparatus claim as a
method claim, holding that the doctrine applies to both types of patents. By
holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies to a downstream product
that substantially embodies a patented item, the Court limited a patent
holder's ability to control use of that item post-sale.
89. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). According to Quanta, LGE was "holding the entire
computer industry hostage for billions of dollars in duplicative royalties, on
patents ..... Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *9, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109
(No. 06-937), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3187.
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